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Abstract:Wildlife ecology and management studies have been widely criticized for deficiencies in design or analysis. Manipulative experiments-with controls, randomization, and replication in space and time-provide powerful ways of learning about natural systems and establishing causal relationships, but such studies are rare in our
field. Observational studies and sample surveys are more common; they also require appropriate design and analysis. More important than the design and analysis of individual studies is metareplication: replication of entire studies. Similar conclusions obtained from studies of the same phenomenon conducted under widely differing conditions will give us greater confidence in the generality of those findings than would any single study, however well
designed and executed.
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Wildlife researchers seem to be doing everything
wrong. Few of our studies employ the hypothetico-deductive approach (Romesburg 1981) or gain
the benefits from strong inference (Platt 1964).
We continually conduct descriptive studies, rather
than the more effective manipulative studies. We
rarely select study areas at random, and even less
often do the animals we study constitute a random
sample. We continue to commit pseudoreplication
errors (Hurlbert 1984, Heffner et al. 1996). We
confuse correlation with causation (Eberhardt
1970). Frequently we measure the wrong variables such as indices to things we really care
about (Anderson 2001). And we may measure
them in the wrong places (convenience sampling;
Anderson 2001). We often apply meaningless
multivariate methods to the results of our studies
(Rexstad et al. 1988). We test null hypotheses that
not only are silly but are known to be false (Cherry 1998,Johnson 1999, Anderson et al. 2000). We
rely on nonparametric methods that are neither
necessary nor appropriate (Johnson 1995).
Such problems permeate our field. In my early
years as a hypercritical statistician, I read many
articles in TheJournal of WildlifeManagementand
related journals. In virtually every article, I found
problems-often serious ones-in the methods
used to analyze data. That experience was repeated later in a class in evolutionary ecology. During
that class, we critically reviewed many key papers
in evolutionary ecology. Some students were
I E-mail:Douglas_H_Johnson@usgs.gov

assigned to attack, others to defend those articles.
We identified substantial problems in the design,
analysis, or interpretation in nearly all of those
influential and highly regarded studies.
Despite all our transgressions, we must be
doing something right. We have brought some
species back from the brink of extinction. The
bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus),whooping
crane (Grus americana), Aleutian Canada goose
(Branta canadensis leucopareia), and gray wolf
(Canis lupus) were extremely rare over much or
all of their range only a few years ago; now they
are much more common. Many of us had given
up on the black-footed ferret (Mustela nigripes)
and California condor (Gymnogypscalifornianus),
species that, while still at risk, appear to be recovering. And we can manage for abundance if we
want to, such as we have done for white-tailed
deer (Odocoileusvirginianus) and mallards (Anas
platyrhynchos).Recently,Jack Ward Thomas spoke
of the "tremendous record of success" in our
field (Thomas 2000:1).
Why this apparent inconsistency between our
error-prone methods and the successes of our
profession? I hope to address that question here
by discussing what truly is important in scientific
research. I first discuss causation, then manipulative experimentation as a powerful way of learning about causal mechanisms. The 3 cornerstones
of experimentation are control, randomization,
and replication. These features also are integral
to observational studies and sample surveys,
which are more common in our field. For those
types of studies especially, I argue that the most
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important feature is replication. Further, I expand this concept to the level of metareplication-replication of entire studies-and suggest
that this is the most reliable method of learning
about the world. It is a natural way of human
thinking and is consistent with a Bayesian
approach to statistical inference. Metareplication
allows us to exploit the values of small studies,
each of which individually may be unable to
reach definitive conclusions. Metareplication
provides us greater confidence that certain relationships are general and not specific to the circumstances that prevailed during a single study.

where Yt(u) is the number of squirrels in woodlot
u after the treatment, and Y (u) is the number of
squirrels in that woodlot if the treatment had not
been applied (I follow Rubin [1974] and Holland
[1986] here). If the woodlot is logged, then you
can observe Y( u) but not Y( u). If the treatment
is not applied, then you can observe Y( u) but not
Yt(u). Thus arises the fundamental problem of
causal inference: you cannot observe the values
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CAUTIONABOUT CAUSATION
The "management" in "wildlife management"
implies causality.We believe we can perform some
management action that will produce a predictable response by wildlife. Even if the causes
cannot be manipulated, it is useful to know the
mechanisms that determine certain outcomes,
such as that spring migration of birds is a response
to increasing day length, or that drought reduces
the number of wetland basins that contain water.
The concept of causation is most readily adopted in the physical sciences, where models of the
behavior of atoms, planets, and other inanimate
objects are applicable over a wide range of conditions (Barnard 1982) and the controlling factors
are few (e.g., pressure and temperature are sufficient to determine the volume of a gas). In the
physical sciences, causality implies lawlike necessity. In many fields, however, notions of causality
reduce to those of probability, which suggests
exceptions and lack of regularity. Here, causation
means that an action "tends to make the consequence more likely, not absolutely certain" (Pearl
2000:1). This is so in wildlife ecology because of
the multitude of factors that influence a system.
For example, liberalizing hunting regulations for a
species tends to increase harvest by hunters. In any
specific instance, liberalization may not result in
an increased harvest because of other influences
such as population size of the species, weather
conditions during the hunting season, and the
cost of gasoline as it affects hunter activity.
Suppose you want to determine the effect on
squirrel abundance of some treatment (= putative cause), for example, selective logging in a
woodlot by removing all trees greater than 45 cm
diameter at breast height (dbh). The treatment
effect on some woodlot can be defined as
T= Y,(u) - Y(u),

of Yt(u) and Yc(u) on the same unit. That is, any

particular woodlot is either logged or not.
Holland (1986) described 2 solutions to this
problem. With the first, one has 2 units (u1 and
u2, here woodlots) and assumes they are identical.
Then the treatment effect Tis estimated to be
T= Y,(ul)-

Y(2),

(2)

where u1is treated and u2 is not. This approach is
based on the very strong assumption that the 2
woodlots, if not logged, would have the same
number of squirrels, that is, Y( u2) = Yc(ul). That
assumption is not testable, of course, because 1
woodlot had been logged. It can be made more
plausible by matching the 2 units as closely as possible or by believing that the units are identical.
That latter belief comes more easily to physicists
thinking about molecules than to ecologists
thinking about woodlots, however.
Holland (1986) termed the other solution statistical. One gets an expected, or average, causal
effect T over the units in some population:

T= E(Y,- Y),

(3)

where, unlike with the other solution, different
units can be observed. The statistical solution
replaces the causal effect of the treatment on a
specific unit, which is impossible to observe, by
the averagecausal effect in the population, which
is possible to estimate.
This discussion reflects the need for a control,
something to compare with the treated unit,
which is required for either approach. To follow
the statistical approach, we often invoke randomization. If, for example, we are to compare squirrel numbers on a treated woodlot and an
untreated one, we might get led astray if the
woodlots were of very different size, or if one contained more mast trees, or if one was rife with
predators of squirrels and the other was not. One
way-but not the only way-to protect against
this possibly misleading outcome is to determine
at random which woodlot receives the treatment
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and which does not. This can be done if the researcher has tight control over the experiment; it
is impossible in many "natural experiments" and
observational studies.
But even if you select at random a woodlot for
treatment and another as a control, you still may
end up by chance comparing a large woodlot that
has numerous mast trees and few predators with
a woodlot with opposite characteristics. This
leads to the third important criterion for determining causation: replication. Repeating the randomization process and treatments on several
woodlots reduces the chance that woodlots in any
group consistently are more favorable to squirrels. In summary, then, assessing the effect of
some treatment with a manipulative experiment
requires a control, randomization, and replication (Fisher 1926).
One might attempt to determine the effect of
selective logging on squirrels by comparing
woodlots that have trees greater than 45 cm dbh
with woodlots that lack such large trees. But such
a comparison is not as definitive as a manipulative experiment. The 2 types of woodlots might
differ in numerous ways, other than the presence
or absence of large trees, that influence squirrel
abundance. If variables that are known or suspected to be influential are measured, careful statistical analysis may account for their effects, but
large samples may be necessary, and it is possible
that an important variable went unmeasured.
An ideal design might involve a number of
woodlots on which squirrel density is measured
both before and after the treatment is applied.
Then, instead of comparing the density of squirrels on treated versus untreated woodlots, one
could compare the change in density (before and
after treatment) between the 2 groups. Crossover
designs also provide a powerful way to reduce the
influence of inherent differences among experimental units. Under a crossover design, for a certain time period, some units receive treatments
and other units serve as controls. Then the roles
of the units switch: control units receive treatments and formerly treated units are left alone to
serve as controls. An obvious concern with
crossover designs is that treatment effects may
persist. One remedy is to have a time period between the 2 phases of the study sufficient to allow
treatment effects to dissipate. A crossover design
would not be appropriate for the squirrel-woodlot example because the effect of logging would
persist for decades, if not longer. Crossover
designs were used by Balser et al. (1969) and Tap-
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per et al. (1996) to estimate the effects of predator reduction on prey species. In these studies,
predators were removed from 1 study area for 3
years, while another area served as a control;
after 3 years, the treatments were switched.

Correlationversus Causation:
the Importanceof Mechanisms
It is always useful to have an understanding of
the mechanisms that influence phenomena of
interest and to distinguish causation from correlation. We might be able to relate mallard production to precipitation (Boyd 1981), but more
useful is the understanding that precipitation
affects the condition of wetlands where mallards
breed, which in turn influences breeding propensity, clutch size, and survivalof young (Johnson et
al. 1992). We can have greater confidence in our
findings if they are consistent with mechanisms
that are both reasonable and supported by other
evidence. The presence of such mechanisms gives
credibility that the correlational smoke may in
fact represent causational fire (Holland 1986).
Romesburg (1981) argued that causation may be
invoked if the correlational evidence is accompanied by, for example, the elimination of other
possible causes, demonstration that the correlation occurs under a wide variety of circumstances,
and the existence of a plausible dependence
between the putative cause and the outcome. In
a similar vein, mechanistic models are more useful than descriptive models for understanding
systems (Johnson 2001 a, Nichols 2001).

IFYOUCAN
MANIPULATE,
Manipulative experimentation is a very effective way to determine causal relationships. One
poses questions to nature via experiments such as
selective logging. By manipulating the system
yourself, you reduce the chance that something
other than your treatment causes the results that
are observed. Further, as emphasized by Macnab
(1983), little can be learned about the dynamics
of systems at equilibrium. Manipulation is helpful
to understand how the systems respond to
changes. Experimentation also forms the basis of
what has been termed strong inference (Platt
1964), in which alternative hypotheses are
devised and crucial experiments are performed
to exclude 1 or more of the hypotheses.
Wildlife ecologists sometimes face severe difficulties meeting the needs of control, randomization, and replication in manipulative experiments.
Many systems are too large and complex for ecol-
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ogists to manipulate (Macnab 1983). Often "treatments"-such as oil spills-are applied by others,
and wildlife ecologists are called in to evaluate
their effects. In such situations, randomization is
impossible and replication undesirable. Methods
for conducting environmental studies, other than
experiments with replications, are available
(Smith and Sugden 1988, Eberhardt and Thomas
1991); among these are experiments without replications, observational studies, and sample surveys.
Replication is particularly difficult with experiments at the ecosystem level, which are more complex but also more meaningful than experiments
at microcosm or mesocosm levels, where replication is more feasible (Carpenter 1990, 1996;
Schindler 1998). Experiments lacking replications
can be, and indeed often have been, analyzed by
taking multiple measurements of the system and
treating them as independent replicates. This
practice was criticized by Eberhardt (1976) and
Hurlbert (1984), the latter naming it pseudoreplication. I address this topic more fully below.
Observational studies lack the critical element
of control by the investigator, although they can
be analyzed similarly to an experimental study
(Cochran 1983). One is less certain that the presumed treatment actually caused the observed
response, however. In lieu of controlled experimentation, one can (1) reduce the influence of
extraneous effects by restricting the scope of
inference to situations similar to the one under
observation; (2) employ matching, by which
treated units are compared with units that were
not treated but in other regards are as similar as
possible to the treated units; or (3) adjust for the
effects of other variables during analysis, with
methods such as analysis of covariance (Eberhardt and Thomas 1991).
Longitudinal observational studies, with measurements taken before and after some treatment, generally are more informative than crosssectional observational studies, in which treated
and untreated units are studied only after the
treatment (Cox and Wermuth 1996). (Of course,
measurements on experimental and control
units before and after treatments are highly desirable in experimental studies, as well as observational studies.) Intervention analysis is a method
used to assess the effect of some distinct treatment (intervention) that has been applied to a
system. The intervention was not assigned by the
investigator and cannot reasonably be replicated.
One approach is to model the system as a time
series and look for changes subsequent to the
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intervention. That approach was taken with airquality data by Box and Tiao (1975), who sought
to determine how ozone levels might have
responded to events such as a change in the formulation of gasoline.
Sometimes it is known that a major treatment will
be applied at some particularsite such as a dam to
be constructed on a river. It may be feasible to
study that river before as well as after the dam is
constructed. That simple before-and-after comparison suffers from the weakness that any change
that occurred coincidental with dam construction,
such as a decrease in precipitation, would be confounded with changes resulting from the dam,
unless the changes were specifically included in
the model. To account for the effects of other variables, one can study similar riversduring the same
before-and-afterperiod. Ideally, these riverswould
be similar to and close enough to the treated
river so to be equally influenced by other variables
but not influenced by the treatment itself. This
design has been called the BACI (before-after,
control-impact) design (Stewart-Oaten et al.
1986, Stewart-Oatenand Bence 2001, Smith 2002)
and is used for assessing the effects of impacts.
It is difficult for investigators to manipulate
large and complex systems such as ecosystems.
But wildlife managers, as well as those who manage ecosystems for other objectives such as timber production, do so frequently. This disparity
between investigators and managers led Macnab
(1983) to recommend that management activities
be viewed as experiments that offer opportunities
to learn about large systems. Actions taken for
management benefits generally lack controls,
randomization, and replication; such shortcomings can be remedied by incorporating these features into the experiment. Key assumptions
should be identified and stated as hypotheses,
rather than treated as facts. The results of management actions, even if they show no effect,
should be measured and reported.
The adaptive resource management approach
blends the idea of learning about a system with
the management of the system (Walters 1986,
Williams et al. 2002). The key notion, which
moves the concept beyond a "trysomething and
if it doesn't work try something else" attitude, is
that knowledge about the system becomes one of
the products of the system that is to be optimized.
Sample surveys differ from experiments in that
one endeavors either to estimate some characteristic over some domain-such as the number of
mallards in the major breeding range in North
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CONTROLS
The term control, confusingly, has at least 3 different meanings in experimental design. The
first meaning, which is more general and not
specifically addressed here, involves the investigator's role. In a controlled study, the treatment
(cause) is assigned by the investigator; the study
is an experiment. In an uncontrolled study, the
treatment is determined to some extent by factors beyond the investigator's control; the study is
observational (Holland 1986). The second meaning, design control, implies that, while some
experimental units receive a treatment, others
(the "controls") do not. The third meaning, statistical control, means that other variables that
may influence the response are measured so that
we may estimate their effects and attempt to eliminate them statistically.
The major benefit of design control is to provide a basis for comparison between treated and
untreated units. It reduces the error; our measured response is likely to reflect only the treatment rather than a variety of other things. Statistical control usually is less effective in reducing
error and is applied after treatments are applied.
Sometimes strict design controls are not possible.
Intervention analysis and BACI designs can
demonstrate that some variablesmay have changed
subsequent to the intervention or impact, but
one will be less confident from that analysis that
the intervention caused that change. Confidence
will increase if potential confounding variables are
measured and their effects are accounted for during analysis-that is, through statistical control.
Controls should be distinguished from reference units. The latter are units that represent
some ideal that management actions are intended
to approach. Reference sites are especially useful
in restoration ecology, when evaluating the effectiveness of alternative management activities for
restoring degraded areas to conditions embodied
in the reference sites (Provencher et al. 2002).

RANDOMIZATION
Randomization can occur at 2 levels. In both
experiments and sample surveys, randomization
means that the objects to be studied are randomly
selected from some population (called a target
population) for which inference is desired. Accordingly, each member of that population has some
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chance of being included in the sample. Chances
may be the same for all members, but that is not
necessary. At a second level, in a manipulative
experiment, randomization means that the treatment each unit receives is randomly determined.
Randomization makes variation among sample
units, due to variables that are not accounted for,
act randomly, rather than in some consistent and
potentially misleading manner. Randomization
thereby reduces the chance of confounding with
other variables. Instead of controlling for the
effects of those unaccounted-for variables, randomization makes them tend to cancel one
another out, at least in large samples. In addition,
randomization reduces any intentional or unintentional bias of the investigator. It further provides an objective probability distribution for a
test of significance (Barnard 1982).
While randomizing the assignment of treatments to units is crucial in experimentation, I
suggest that randomization in selecting the units
in an experiment or sample survey is less important than control or replication. First, the intended benefits of randomization apply only conceptually. Randomly sampling from a population
does not ensure that the resulting sample will
represent that population, only that, if many such
samples are taken, the average will be representative. But in reality only a single sample is taken,
and that single sample may or may not be representative. Randomization does make variation act
randomly, rather than systematically. However,
this property is only conceptual, applying to the
notion that samples were repeatedly taken randomly. The single sample that was taken may or
may not have properties that appear systematic.
Randomization ostensibly reduces hidden biases
of, or "cheating" by, an investigator. But, if an
investigator wishes to cheat, why not do so but say
that randomization was employed (Harville 1975)?

What Does a Sample Really Represent?
Any sample, even a nonrandom one, can be
considered a representative sample from some
population, if not the target population. What is
the population for which the sample is representative? Extrapolation beyond the area from which
any sample was taken requires justification on
nonstatistical bases. For example,, studies of animal behavior (or physiology) based on only a few
individuals may reasonably be generalized to
entire species if the behavior patterns (or physiological processes) are relatively fixed (i.e., the
units are homogeneous with respect to that fea-
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ture). In contrast, traits that vary more widely,
such as habitat use of a species or annual survival
rates, cannot be generalized as well from a sample of comparable size. Consistency of a feature
among the sampled and unsampled units is more
critical than the randomness of a sample. Can
one comfortably draw an inference to a population from a sample, even if that sample is nonrandom? In reality, most useful inferences
require extrapolation beyond the sampled population. For example, if we want to predict the consequences of some action carried out in the
future based on a study conducted in the past, we
are extrapolating forward in time.

Is Randomization Always Good?
Suppose you want to assess the characteristics
of vegetation in a 10-ha field. You decide to place
8 quadrats in the field and measure vegetation
within each of those quadrats. Results from those
8 samples will be projected to the entire field. You
can select the 8 points entirely at random. It is
possible that all 8 quadrats will be within the same
small area of the field, however, and be very different from most of the field. Choosing points at
random ensures that, if you repeat the process
many times, on average you will have a representative sample. But in actuality you have only 1 of
the infinitely many possible samples; randomness
tells you nothing about your particular sample. It
might be perfectly representative of the entire
field, or it might be very deviant. The chance that
it is representative increases with sample size, so
the risk of a random sample not being representative is especially troublesome in small samples.
There are methods for taking samples to increase the chance that they better represent the
entire field. One method is to stratify, if there is
prior knowledge of some variable likely to relate
to the variable of interest. Another method is to
take systematic rather than random samples.
Hurlbert (1984) emphasized the importance of
interspersion in experimental design, having
units well distributed in space; this serves 1 goal
of randomization, often more successfully. Such
balanced designs diminish the errors of an experiment (Fisher 1971).

What Is Independence, and Is It Necessary?
Randomization provides a basis for probability
distributions because the observations in a random sample generally are statistically independent. Independence is a mathematically wondrous property, since it facilitates the definition
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of distributional properties, such as the variance,
test statistics, and P-values. But what is independent? Consider, as did Millspaugh et al. (1998),
the assessment of habitat preference of animals
that occur together. If the animals are inextricably tied together, such as a mother and her
dependent offspring, then the locations of each
certainly are not independent. If the animals
occur together simply because they favor the same
habitats, Millspaugh et al. (1998) argued that the
individual animals are independently making
habitat choices and thus should be treated as
independent units. Then there are intermediate
situations, such as a mother and her not-quitedependent offspring. Ascertaining independence
is not a simple matter; statistical independence
can be evaluated only in reference to a specific
data set and a specified model (Hurlbert 1997).
But what is the problem if data are not independent? Suppose you have 100 observations, but only
50 of them are independent, and for each of those
there is another observation that is identical to it.
So the apparent sample size is 100, but only 50 of
those are independent. If you estimate the average
of some characteristic of the individuals, the mean
in fact will be a good estimator. But the standard
error will be biased low. And a test statistic, say,for
comparing the mean of that group with another,
will be inflated and will tend to reject the null
hypothesis too often (e.g., Erickson et al. 2001).
This is a fundamental problem for any test statistic from an individual study. There are ways to
correct for the disparity between the number of
observations and the number of independent
observations. Dependencies among observations
sometimes can be modeled explicitly, such as with
generalized estimating equations (Liang and
Zeger 1986). Dependencies, such as sampling
from clusters of units, often result in overdispersion, in which the sample variance exceeds the
theoretical value; in such cases certain adjustments to the theoretical variance can be made
(McCullagh and Nelder 1989, Burnham and
Anderson 2002). A similar issue arises with respect
to temporally or spatially correlated observations.
I argue later that problems caused by a lack of
independence, while affecting inferences from
individual studies, are less consequential than
they appear.

Independence and the Scope of Inference
Suppose you are investigating area sensitivity in
grassland birds. That is, you wonder whether certain species prefer larger patches of grassland to
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smaller patches. Area sensitivity might be manifested by reduced densities (not just total abundance) in smaller habitat patches or by the avoidance of habitat edges (Faaborg et al. 1993,Johnson
and Winter 1999, Johnson 2001 b). Avoidance of
edge means that birds are restricted to the interior portions of a patch, which results in reduced
densities for the patch as a whole. To determine
whether certain species are area-sensitive, you
might compare densities of the species in patches of similar habitat but different size. Alternatively, you might examine the locations of birds
(let's say nests, but we could consider song perches, etc.) within a habitat patch and determine
whether there is evidence that densities of nests
are reduced near edges compared to interiors.
For comparing densities, the sample units are
patches. Those are the units to which a "treatment" (patch size) pertains; all birds in that
patch have the same patch size. For examining
edge avoidance, in contrast, the sample units are
nests because each has its own, possibly unique,
value of the "treatment" (distance to edge). Logically, then, the latter approach would be more
powerful because a single patch might produce
dozens of sample units (nests), resulting in much
larger sample sizes.
Assuming there is no free lunch, what is happening here? The disparityis the scope of inference. If
we study densities in patches, the studied patches
can be considered a sample from some target population of patches, and inferences should apply to
that population. If we study nests within a patch
and examine distances to an edge, the inference
is only to that single patch. You might conclude
that birds avoid locating their nests near a habitat
edge, but that conclusion applies only locally.
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than 1 unit. Replication provides 2 benefits. First,
it reduces error because an average of independent errors tends to be smaller than a single
error. Replication serves to ensure against making a decision based on a single, possibly unusual, outcome of a treatment or measurement of a
unit. Second, because we have several estimates
of the same effect, we can estimate the error, as
the variation in those estimates reflects error. We
then can determine whether the value of the treated units are unusually different from those of the
untreated units. The validity of that estimate of
error depends on the experimental units having
been drawn randomly; thus, the validity is ajoint
property of randomization and replication.

Is ReplicationAlways Necessary?
Imagine yourself cooking a stew.You want to see
if it needs salt. You dip a teaspoon into the kettle
and take a taste. If it's not salty enough, you add
more salt. Notice that you did not take replicate
samples. Only one. (Further, you probably didn't
randomly select where in the kettle to sample;
you most certainly took it from the surface and
most likely near the center of the kettle.) Cooks
have been using this sampling approach for probably centuries, without evident problem. Why?
The single, nonrandomly selected sample generally suffices because the stew is fairly homogeneous with respect to salt. A teaspoon from 1
location will be about as salty as a teaspoon from
another. This is because the stew has been stirred.
Note that the same approach would not work for
sampling meat, which is distributed less uniformly throughout a stew. Replication may not be necessary if all the members of the universe are identical, or nearly enough so.

ReplicationIs Necessary for Randomization OTHERLEVELSOF REPLICATION
to Be Useful
I find it useful to think of replication occurring
The properties of randomization in the selection of units to study are largely conceptual; that
is, they pertain hypothetically to some long-term
average. For example, randomization makes
errors act randomly, rather than in a consistent
direction. But in any single observation, or any
single study, the error may well be consistent. It is
only through replication that long-term properties hold.

REPLICATION
Replication requires that a sample consist of
more than 1 member of a population, or that
treatments be applied independently to more

at 3 different levels (Table 1). The fundamental
notion is of ordinary replication in an experiment: treatments are applied independently to
several units. In our squirrel-woodlot example,
we would want several woodlots to be logged and
several to be left as controls. (Comparable considerations apply to observational studies or sample surveys.) As mentioned above, replication
serves to ensure against making a decision based
on a single, possibly unusual, outcome of the
treatment. It also provides an estimate of the variation associated with the treatment. Other levels
of replication are pseudoreplication and metareplication.
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Table1. The types of replicationdifferin whatactions are repeated,whatscope of inferenceis valid,and the roleof P-values.
Repeatedaction
Measurement
Pseudoreplication
Ordinaryreplication Treatment
Metareplication
Study
Term

P-value
Scope of inference
measured
Object
Wrong
Objectsforwhichsamples are representative "OK"
Situationsforwhichstudies are representative Irrelevant

Pseudoreplication
At a lower level than ordinary replication is what
Hurlbert (1984) called pseudoreplication. Often
couched in analysis of variance terms (using the
wrong error term in an analysis), typically it arises
by repeating measurements on units and treating
such measurements as if they represented independent observations. The treatments may have
been assigned randomly and independently to
the units, but repeated observations on the same
unit are not independent. This was what Hurlbert
(1984) called simple pseudoreplication and what
Eberhardt (1976) had included in pseudodesign.
Pseudoreplication was common when Hurlbert
(1984) surveyed literature on manipulative ecological experiments, mostly published during
1974-1980, and estimated that about 27% of the
experiments involved pseudoreplication. Heffner et al. (1996:2561) found that the frequency of
pseudoreplication in more recent literature
(1991-1992) had dropped but was still "disturbingly high." Stewart-Oaten (2002) provided
some keys for recognizing pseudoreplication,
which is not always straightforward.

Metareplication
At a higher level than ordinary replication is
what I term metareplication. Metareplication involves the replication of studies,preferably in different years, at different sites, with different
methodologies, and by different investigators.
Conducting studies in different years and at different sites reduces the chance that some artifact
associated with a particular time or place caused
the observed results; it should be unlikely that an
unusual set of circumstances would manifest itself
several times or, especially, at several sites. Conducting studies with different methods similarly
reassures us that the results were not simply due
to the methods or equipment employed to get
those results. And having more than 1 investigator
perform studies of similar phenomena reduces
the opportunity for the results to be due to some
hidden bias or characteristic of that researcher.
Just as replication within individual studies
reduces the influence of errors in observations by

Analysis
Pseudo-analysis
Analysis
Meta-analysis

averaging the errors, metareplication reduces the
influence of errors among studies themselves.
Youden (1972) provided a classic example of
the need for metareplication. He described the
sequence of 15 studies conducted during
1895-1961 to estimate the average distance between Earth and the sun. Each scientist obtained
an estimate, as well as a confidence interval for
that estimate. Every estimate obtained was outside
the confidence interval for the previous estimate!
The confidence each investigator had in his estimate thus was severely overrated. The critical message from this saga is that we should have far less
confidence in any individual study than we are led
to believe from internal estimates of reliability.
This also points out the need to conduct studies
of any phenomenon in different circumstances,
with different methods, and by different investigators. That is, to do metareplication.
Allied to this reasoning is Levins' notion of
truth lying at the "intersection of independent
lies" (Levins 1966:423). He considered alternative
models, each of which suffered from I or more
simplifying assumptions (and all models involve
some simplification of the system being modeled) that made each model unrealistic in some
way or another. He suggested that if the models-despite their differing assumptions-lead to
similar results, we have a robust finding that is
relatively free of the details of each model. In the
context of metareplication, although independent studies of some phenomenon each may suffer from various shortcomings, if they paint
substantially similar pictures, we can have confidence in what we see.
The idea of robustness in data analysis is analogous to robustness among studies. Robustness in
the analysis of data from a single study means that
the conclusions are not strongly dependent on the
assumptions involved in the analysis (Mallows
1979). Similar inferences would be obtained from
statisticalmethods that differ in their assumptions.
For example, conclusions might not vary even if
the data do not follow the assumed distribution,
such as the Normal, or if outliers are present in the
data. Analogously, robustness in metareplication
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means that similar interpretations about phenomena are reached from studies that differ in methods, investigators, locations, times, etc.
The notion that studies should be replicated
certainly is not new. Replication, in the form of
repetition of key experiments by others, has been
conventional practice in science far longer than
statistics itself has been (Carpenter 1990). Fisher
(1971) observed that conclusions are alwaysprovisional, like progress reports, interpreting the evidence so far accrued. Tukey (1960) proposed that
conclusions derive from the assessment of a series
of individual results, rather than a particular result. Eberhardt and Thomas (1991:57) observed
that "truly definitive single experiments are very
rare in any field of endeavor, progress is actually
made through sequences of investigations." Cox
and Wermuth (1996:10) noted that, "Of course,
deep understanding is unlikely to be achieved by a
single study, no matter how carefully planned."
Hurlbert and White (1993:149) suggested that,
although serious statistical errors were rampant in
at least 1 area of ecology, principal conclusions,
"those concerning phenomena that have been
studied by several investigators, have been unaffected." And Catchpole (1989:287) stated that,
"Most hypotheses are tested, not in the splendid
isolation of one finely controlled 'perfect' experiment, but in the wider context of a whole series
of experiments and observations. Surely a much
more valuable form of validity comes from the
independent repetition of experiments by colleagues in different parts of the world." As summarized by Anderson et al. (2001:312), "In the
long run, science is safeguarded by repeated
studies to ascertain what is real and what is merely a spurious result from a single study."

MORE ON METAREPLICATION
What's P Got to Do With It?
P-values resulting from statistical tests of null
hypotheses often are used to judge the signifi-

cance of findings from a study. A small P-value
suggests either that the null hypothesis is not true
or that an unusual result has occurred. P-values
often are misinterpreted as: (1) the probability
that the results were due to chance, (2) an indication of the reliability of the result, or (3) the
probability that the null hypothesis is true (Carver 1978, Johnson 1999). Small P-values are taken
to represent strong evidence that the null
hypothesis is false, but in reality the connection
between P and Pr{H0 is trueldatal is nebulous
(Berger and Sellke 1987).
R. A. Fisher was an early advocate of P-values,
but he actually recommended that they be used
opposite to the way they are mostly used now.
Fisher viewed a significant P-value as providing
reason to continue studying the phenomenon
(recalling that either the hypothesis was wrong or
something unusual happened). In stark contrast,
modern researchers often use nonsignificant Pvalues as reason to continue study; many investigators, when faced with nonsignificant results,
argue that, "a larger sample size [i.e., further
research] is needed to reach significance."

The Importance of Consistent Methods in
Replication
Scientists are encouraged to replicate studies
using the same methods as were used in the original studies. This practice eliminates variation due
to methodology and, if different results are
obtained, suggests that the initial results may have
been an accident (Table 2). That is, they did not
bear up under metareplication. Obtaining the
same results when using the same methods, however, allows for the possibility that the results were
specific to the method, rather than a general truth.
Replication with different methods is critical to
determine whether results are robust with
respect to methodology and not an artifact of the
methods employed. When we get consistent
results with different methods, we have greater
confidence in those results; the results are robust

Table2. Thereare both advantagesand disadvantagesto replicatinga studywiththe same or differentmethodsas the original
study.
Methodsof originaland
replicatedstudies
Same
Different

Resultsfromoriginaland replicatedstudies
Same
Results may have been specificto method,
ratherthan a generaltruth
Resultsare robustwithrespectto method

Different
Originalresultsmay have been accidental,
not bearingup undermetareplication
Results may have been an artifactof the
methodused
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with respect to method. Should we get different
results when different methods are used, the
original results may have been artifacts of the
methods (Table 2).

What to Do With Surprises?
A cogent argument has been made that only
well-thought-out hypotheses should be tested in a
study. Doing so avoids "fishing expeditions" and
the chance of claiming that accidental findings
are real (Johnson 1981, Rexstad et al. 1988,
Anderson et al. 2001, Burnham and Anderson
2002). I think that surprise findings in fact should
be considered, but not as confirmed results from
the study so much as prods for further investigations. They generate hypotheses to test. For
example, suppose you conduct a regression
analysis involving many explanatory variables. If
you use a stepwise procedure to select variables,
results from that analysis can give very misleading
estimates of effect sizes, P-values, and the like
(Pope and Webster 1972, Hurvich and Tsai 1990).
Variables deemed to be important may or may
not actually have major influence on the
response variable, and conclusions to that effect
should not be claimed. It is appropriate, on the
other hand, to use the results in a further investigation, focusing on the explanatory variables that
the analysis had suggested were influential. It is
better to conduct a new study (i.e., to metareplicate), but at a minimum cross-validation will be
useful. In that approach, a model is developed
with part of the data set and evaluated on the
remaining data. This is not to suggest that a priori hypotheses are not important, or that carefully designed studies to evaluate those hypotheses
are not a highly appropriate way to conduct science. Only that a balance between exploratory
and confirmatory research is needed. Studies
should be designed to learn something, not merely to generate questions for further research.
Apparent findings need to be rigorously confirmed. If scientists look only at variables known
or suspected to be influential, however, how
would we get new findings?

Meta-analysis
Meta-analysis essentially is an analysis of analyses (Hedges and Olkin 1985, Osenberg et al.
1999, Gurevitch and Hedges 2001). The units
being analyzed are themselves analyses. Metaanalysis dates back to 1904, when Karl Pearson
grouped data from various military tests and concluded that vaccination against intestinal fever
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was ineffective (Mann 1994). Often studies of
comparable effects are analyzed by vote counting:
of the studies that looked for the effect, this many
had statistically significant results and that many
did not. One problem with the vote-counting
approach is that, if the true effect is not strong
and sample sizes are not large, most studies will
not detect the effect. So a critical review of the
studies would conclude that most studies found
no effect, and the effect would be dismissed.
In contrast, meta-analysis examines the full
range of estimated effects (not P-values), whether
or not they were individually statistically significant. From the resulting pattern may emerge evidence of consistent effects, even if they are small.
Mann (1994) cited several instances in which
meta-analyses led to dramatically different conclusions than did expert reviews of studies that
used vote-counting methods. Meta-analysis does
have a serious danger, however, in publication
bias (Berlin et al. 1989). A study that demonstrates an effect at a statistically significant level is
more likely to be written for publication, favorably reviewed by referees and editors, and ultimately published than is a study without such significant effects (Sterling et al. 1995). So the
published literature on an effect may give a very
biased picture of what the research in toto
demonstrated. (The medical community worries
that ineffective and even harmful medical practices may be adopted if positive results are more
likely to be published than negative results [Hoffert 1998]. Indeed, an on-line journal, the Journal
of NegativeResultsin Biomedicine,is being launched
to correct distortions caused by a general bias
against null results [Anonymous 2002].) Even if
results from unpublished studies could be
accessed, much care would be needed to evaluate
them. Bailar (1995) observed that quality metaanalysis requires expertise in the subject matter
reviewed. A question always looms about unpublished studies (Hoffert 1998): Was the study not
published because it generated no statisticallysignificant results or because it was flawed in some
way? Further, could it be that the study was not
published because it was contrary to the prevailing thinking at the time? Yet, despite the concerns with meta-analysis, it does provide a vehicle
for thoughtfully conducting a synthesis of the
studies relevant to a particular question.

Weak Studies May Be OK, But ...
Statisticians, including myself (Johnson 1974),
regularly advise against conducting studies that
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lack sufficient power. Observations in those studies are too few to yield a high probability of rejecting some null hypothesis, even if the hypothesis is
false. While large samples are certainly preferable
to small samples, I no longer believe that it is
appropriate to condemn studies with small samples. Indeed, it may be preferable to have the results of numerous small but well-designed studies
rather than results from a single "definitive"investigation. This is so because the single study,despite
large samples, may have been compromised by an
unusual happenstance or by the effect of a "lurking variable" (a third variable that induces a correlation between 2 other variables that are otherwise unrelated). Numerous small studies, due to
the benefits of metareplication, are less at jeopardy of yielding misleading conclusions.
One danger of a small study is that the sampled
units do not adequately represent the target population. Lack of representation also can plague larger studies, however. I suspect that the greatest danger of a small study is the tendency to accept the
null hypothesis as truth, if it is not rejected. Concluding that a hypothesis is true simply because it
was not rejected in a statisticaltest is folly. Nonetheless, it is done frequently; Johnson (1999, 2002)
cited numerous instances in which authors of The
Journal of WildlifeManagementarticles concluded
that null hypotheses were true, even when samples
were small and test statisticswere nearly significant.
Metareplication protects against situations in
which there is an effect, but it is small and therefore not statistically significant in individual studies, and thus is never claimed. Hence, small studies should not be discouraged, as long as the
investigators acknowledge that they are not definitive. Studies should be designed to address the
topic as effectively and efficiently as possible. If
the scope has to be narrow and the scale has to be
small, or if logistic constraints preclude large samples, results still may be worthwhile and should
be published, with their limitations acknowledged. Without meta-analysis or a similar strategy, any values of small studies will not be realized.

Should AuthorsAvoidManagement
Recommendations?
This journal encourages authors to present
management implications deriving from the studies they describe. That practice may not alwaysbe
appropriate. Results from a single study, unless
supported by evidence from other studies, may be
misleading. The fact that a study is the only one
dealing with a certain species in a particular state

* Johnson 929
IMPORTANCE
OF REPLICATION
is no reason to base management recommendations solely on that single study. Recommendations should be based on a larger body of knowledge. Similarly,manuscripts should be considered
for publication even if they are not "groundbreaking," but instead provide support for inferences originally obtained from previous studies.
What about "management studies"?These seem
to be studies conducted by others than scientists
or graduate students. They also are claimed to be
in less need of quality (good design, adequate
sample size, etc.) than are "research studies." I
would argue that the reverse may in fact be true:
Management studies should at least equal research investigations in quality. If an erroneous
conclusion is reached in a research study, the
only negative consequence is the publication of
that error in a journal. And, hopefully, further
investigation will demonstrate that the published
conclusion was unwarranted. In contrast, an erroneous conclusion reached in a management
study may well lead to some very inappropriate
management action being taken, with negative
consequences to wildlife and their habitats.

and the BayesianApproach
Metareplication
The Bayesian philosophy offers a more natural
way to think about metareplication than does the
traditional (frequentist) approach. In concept, a
frequentist considers only the likelihood function, acting as if the only information about a variable under investigation derives from the study at
hand. A Bayesian accounts for the context and
history more explicitly by considering the likelihood in conjunction with the prior distribution.
The prior incorporates what is known or believed
about the variable before the study was conducted. I think people naturally tend to be Bayesians.
They have what might be termed mental inertia:
they tend to continue in their existing beliefs
even in the face of evidence against those beliefs.
Only with repeated doses of new evidence do
they change their opinions. Sterne and Smith
(2001) suggested that the public, by being cynical
about the results of new medical studies, were
exhibiting a subconscious Bayesianism.

CONCLUSIONS
Any imaginative wildlife biologist can easily list a
dozen or more variables that could influence a
response variable of interest, be it the number of
squirrels in a woodlot, the nest success rate of
bobolinks (Dolichonyxoryzivorus)in a field, or the
survival rate of mallards in a particular year. An
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investigation of such a response variable will adequately determine the influences of only a few of
the multitude of explanatory variables. The
remainder will not be under the investigator's
control and indeed may not even be known to the
investigator, or may be known but not measured.
The extent to which these other variables influence the response variable confounds the observed relationship between the response variable and the explanatory variables under study.
In addition, those unknown influences may
restrict the scope of inference for the relationships that are discovered.
Consider again our example of estimating the
effect on squirrel density of selectively logging
woodlots. Suppose that, in general, such logging
does reduce squirrel density. In any particular situation, however, that result might not follow
because of the effects of other (possibly unmeasured) variables. Predators of squirrels in a logged
woodlot might have been reduced, offsetting any
population decline associated with logging. Or
an outbreak of disease in the squirrels might have
reduced their numbers in the unlogged woodlot,
erasing any difference between that woodlot and
the one that was logged.
Design control (restricting the range in variation of potentially confounding variables)
reduces the influence of such variables, but that
practice is not always feasible. Randomization
tends to make variables that are not studied act,
well, randomly, rather than in some consistent
direction. With replication, those variables then
contribute to variance in the observed relationship, rather than a bias. Nonetheless, in any single study, those unobserved relationships may
give us a misleading impression of the true relationship between the response variable and the
explanatory variables under study.
Metareplication provides us greater confidence
that certain relationships are general. Obtaining
consistent inferences from studies conducted
under a wide variety of conditions will assure us
that the conclusions are not unique to the particular set of circumstances that prevailed during the
study. Further, by metareplicating studies, we
need not worry about P-values,issues of what constitute independent observations, and other concerns involving single studies. We can take a broader look, seeking consistency of effects among
studies. Consistent results suggest generality of
the relationship. Inconsistency will lead us either
not to accept the results as truth or to determine
conditions under which the results hold and

those under which they do not. That approach
will lead to understanding the mechanisms.
If, indeed, most individual wildlife studies are
flawed to some degree, why have we any confidence whatsoever in the science? Perhaps the
errors are inconsequential. Or, possibly we don't
really believe in those single studies anyway,and
don't take action until a clear pattern emerges
from disparate studies of the phenomenon. Our
innate Bayesianism may be weighting results
from an individual study with our prior thinking,
based on other things we know or believe.
To conclude, we certainly should use the best
statistical methods appropriate for a given data
set to maximize the value of those data. However,
as Hurlbert (1994:495) wisely noted, "lack of
understanding of basic principles and simple
methods by practising ecologists is a serious problem, while under-use of advanced statistical methods is not." More important than the methods
used to analyze data, we should collect the best
data we can. We should use the principles of
randomization, and replicadesign-controls,
tion in manipulative experiments; matching and
measuring appropriate covariates in observational studies. And, most critically, studies themselves
need to be replicated to have confidence in the
findings and their generality. Metareplication
exploits the value of small studies, obviates concerns about P-values and similar issues, protects
against claiming spurious effects to be real, and
facilitates the detection of small effects that are
likely to be missed in individual studies.
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